Theabovesamplesoffixed（crop）atterrentalpaymentsarestatedinmonetaryunits.[5]AccordingtoobservationscollectedbytheDepartmentofRealEstates,coveringtwenty-twoprov-incesinChina,cashrentsaregenerallyslightlylowerthancroprents.[6]Thisdifferentialcanbeexplain,owingtotheSino-JapaneseWar,beginningin1937,13.[7]Thisobservation,ofcourse,,renegotiationofcashrentcontractsbeesmorefrequentandthusmorecostly.

Thecharacteristicsoffixed-rentcontractsarenotofspecialinterestexceptforonefeaturewhichwesingleouttoelaborateonhere-thefrequentinclusionoftheprovisionforrentalreduc-tionaccordingto”localcustoms”ina”famine”year（seesamplesaandc）,aprovisionwhichisabsentunderan”iron-sheet”rent（seesampleb）.Letuscallthisprovisionanescapeclauseforthetenant,theinclusionofwhichinafixed-rentcontractimposesariskburdenonthelandowner.

Wemayinterpret”localcustoms”asasetofmarketpricesfor”famine”adjustments,eventhoughtheexactmagnitud”bad”thatthemarketconsidersittobea”famine.”Givenasufficientlylargenumberoffixed-rentcontractswhichincludetheescapeclause,petitionamonglandownerstokeeptheirtenantswillyieldc,theincreasedriskburdenonthelandownerassociatedwiththeinclusionoftheescapeclauseimpliesthatapremiumwillbeaddedtothe”fixed”rentoverthe”iron-sheet.”[8]

Thelandownerwillfurnish[somanycatties]ofseed,togetherwith[somanypairs]ofwaterbuffalo,[somanyhead]ofdonkeys,,andshallnotbedamagedorlost[bythetenant]……andtheymust[aforementioned]rentalrateissubjecttoadjustmentaccordingtolocalcustomsinafamineyear.[4]

Fromtheaboveonemayd,Ihavearguedthatthetransactioncostishigherforsharerentthanforfixedrent,tyofchoiceforriskdispersionthanasharecontract,,,since,asnotedearlier,evidenceindicatesthatsharerentisslightlyhigherthanfixedrentowingtotheaddedriskburdenimposedonthelandowner,Iconjecturethatthelandownersinewouldbehigherthanwithasharecontractifanescapeclaus,wefindthatsuchanescapeclauseexistsintherealworld,disguisedunderthenameofwagecontract.

Althoughshiftingtheriskburdenbyincludingtheescapeclauseinafixed-rentcontractisnotquitethesameastheriskdispersioninasharecontract,”famine”isdefinedasoccurringwhentheactualharvestisred”iron-sheet”contractorbuyingan”escape”rightbypayingan”insurance”premiumtothelandowner-suchthatintheeventof”famine,”rentalpaymentwillbereducedbyacertainpercentageaccordingtoamarketrule.

Tofurthertheargument:therecouldexistinthemarketplacenotjustoneescapeclauseasobserved,butawiderangeofsimilarclauseseachassociatedwithadifferentlevelof”famine,”suchthatthetenantcould,theriskburdencouldbedispersedbetweenthecontractingpartiesinaninfinitenumberofways,lauses-inparticular,thecostofdefiningdifferentlevelsof”famine”inthemarketplace,andthecostofnegotiatingtherentalreductionforeach-theincrementalgainsofhavingthemmaybesosmallthatnofurther”custom”,analternativedevicechosenisasharecontract,underwhichmultiple”escape”provisionsforthetenantwillbeimplicit,andwithinwhichtherentalpaymentisnolongerfixed.[9]

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